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Executive Summary
The world economic crisis, as well as other events such as the Russian-Georgian
war in August 2008 and the change of the American administration, have prompted
some analysts to speak about a “paradigm shift” in international relations or the
“dismantling of the post-Cold War world order”. Indeed, the global order, as well
as Georgia’s security environment, have become considerably more fluid, uncertain
and unpredictable than was the case one year ago. Yet careful analysis shows that
the actual changes in global and regional politics do not merit such sweeping
generalizations so far.
New trends in relations between Russia and the Western actors (the USA, Euro-
pean Union, and major European nation-states), internal developments in Russia
and Ukraine – both of which have been especially hardly hit by the economic crisis
– and the efforts of Turkey to enhance its political profile in the Caucasus deserve
special attention from the perspective of Georgia’s security environment. While
scenarios for the future – especially if the economic crisis deepens further – may
be destabilizing, the fundamentals in these relations have not changed yet.
Consequently, the basic principles of Georgia’s foreign political strategy do not
require a fundamental overhaul. Some significant readjustments are in order, how-
ever. These include:
• Prioritizing long-term foreign policy objectives and incremental steps towards
them while quick solutions to the most burning issues of Georgia’s security are
not available;
• Finding more even balance in relations with NATO and the EU, as well as with
the USA and European countries;
• Giving greater priority to internal democratic reforms and achieving more stable
rules for internal political competition;
• Recognizing that while normalizing relations with Russia is of utmost impor-
tance for Georgia’s security, this cannot be achieved if the Russian leadership
and its current political priorities remain in place;
• Seizing opportunities for cooperation and dialogue with actors in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia while admitting that doing so will not bring any short-term po-
litical benefits.
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Events That Have Brought about
Change – or the Perception Thereof
The global economic crisis and some other
important events in the world have prompted
some analysts to speak about an emerging
new paradigm in international relations, or
of the end of the Post-Cold War Order. One
can point out three such events that may
not be equivalent in their scope and impor-
tance, but contributed to the perception of
the increased fluidity of the global order:
(1)Russian-Georgian War in August 2008.
This was the first time since the Cold
War when a major country such as Rus-
sia militarily intervened into a neighbor-
ing state with the intention of changing
its internationally recognized borders and
replacing its democratically elected gov-
ernment. In doing so, Russia openly and
pointedly defied international consensus,
even though it alluded to precedents of
western military interventions in Kosovo
and Iraq in order to justify its actions.
Some analysts compared Russia’s actions
with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia in 1968, or even Nazi Germany’s
annexation of part of the same country
in 1939. Fears were widely expressed
that the world might be entering a pe-
riod of new cold war – though it was
usually added that such a relapse should
absolutely be avoided. Russia’s actions
caused the suspension of relations be-
tween Russia and NATO, as well as
Russia and the EU, although dialogue
with Russia in these and other formats
was later renewed.
(2)Global Economic Crisis. The crisis is still
under way and it is too early to estimate
its full impact on world affairs. There is
consensus that this crisis is the gravest
since the World War II, and some ana-
lysts compare it with the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s. So far it can be said
that the crisis did significantly challenge
confidence in the self-regulatory qualities
of the free market and led to a huge in-
crease of government intervention in and
regulation of economic matters. However,
at this point one cannot make a defini-
tive judgment as to whether this trend
constitutes a set of temporary measures
that will be dropped after the crisis is
overcome, or if they signify the reversal
of the tide towards de-regulation and
privatization that have dominated global
economic policies since the 1970s.
(3)Change of Administration in the US. The
election of Barack Obama to the Ameri-
can presidency may be considered a rou-
tine change of power, but it created ex-
pectations of a fundamental policy shift
not only in the USA, but also around
the globe. In part this may be explained
by Obama’s keenness to stress his con-
trast with the policies of his predeces-
sor, President Bush, who came to be
especially unpopular in the last 2-3 years
of his presidency. These expectations will
probably prove largely exaggerated (ar-
guably, this is becoming clear already),
but against the existing background they
have contributed to the perception that
a new paradigm of global politics may
be in the making.
Historical experience shows that the emer-
gence of a new paradigm of international re-
lations is usually preceded by dramatic
changes in the balance of power which are
often accompanied by major wars and/or
fundamental changes concerning major politi-
cal actors. The last change of this magnitude
was caused by the implosion of the Commu-
nist system and break up of its leader, the
Soviet Union; before that, the global order
was shaped by the results of World War II.
No shifts of this scale are discernible now,
or are visible on the horizon.
However, the degree of change is not to
be overlooked either. It can be said with
confidence that certain assumptions that ap-
peared safe even in the beginning of 2008
are no longer such. Every crisis, political
or economic, creates new opportunities as
well as new challenges, thus prompting
politicians and analysts to take new dar-
ing steps – or at least consider them. The
range of that which is possible in world
politics has broadened, and the level of
uncertainty has risen.
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The Starting Point: the Post-Cold
War Order
Since the reference point for assessing the
importance of the ongoing change is usually
defined as the “post-Cold War order”, it
would be logical first to describe what this
order was. The most striking feature here is
that there has never been explicit consensus
about even the main parameters of this or-
der. This stands in contrast with the preced-
ing period of the Cold War, when, at least,
there was agreement on several major is-
sues: (1) the world order was mainly shaped
through the opposition between the two
power blocs, one led by the United States,
the other by the Soviet Union; (2) the two
blocs defined themselves in ideological
terms, those of liberal democracy and mar-
ket capitalism on the one hand, and the
communist political regime and centrally
planned economy on the other; (3) despite
adversity, for the most part there were no
imminent threats of direct military confron-
tation between the two blocs; (4) the out-
come of the conflict was delayed into the
indefinite future.
Since the cold war, the main actors in glo-
bal politics, or the actual rules of their in-
teraction, have not been clearly defined. One
can only make rather vague generalizations:
(1)Actors. The Post-Cold War tilted in the
direction of so-called unipolarity, with
the global order being seen as dominated
by a single, presumably benevolent ac-
tor, rather than shaped through a bal-
ance of clashing interests. It was uncer-
tain, though, who specifically this single
actor was or could be: the United Na-
tions Security Council, the West (as rep-
resented by NATO), or the United States
with its allies (known as “the coalition
of the willing”). In lieu of a clear defi-
nition, the dominant actor was often am-
biguously referred to as “the international
community”, which presumably included
major powers, international organizations,
and even international civil society or-
ganizations.
(2)Rules. International politics in the Post-
Cold War era was regulated through a
combination of two sets of principles that
sometimes tended to clash. One implied
respect for state sovereignty, which in-
cluded the inviolability of the existing
borders as well as recognition of the right
of each state (however small) to freely
choose its foreign policy direction (this
in effect barred claims to exclusive zones
of influence by major powers). On the
other hand, state sovereignty could be
declared close to null and void in the
event its government committed massive
human rights violations such as genocide
– this allowed humanitarian intervention
by foreign powers that could end in stop-
ping genocide, changing the political re-
gime, or even altering state borders (as it
was in the case of Kosovo).
(3)Values. While liberal democracy was not
universally spread, liberal democracy and
liberal market economy came to be al-
most universally recognized as the best
political and economic regimes respec-
tively. Few countries, most of them ma-
jority Muslim, openly defied this con-
tention. Moreover, the West, that is the
informal community of democratic na-
tions, was fully predominant in political,
military, economic and normative spheres.
Even the single most powerful western
nation, the United States, could claim
such predominance. The expansion of
NATO and the European Union marked
the triumph of liberal values in Europe.
Against this background, it was assumed
that for the first time in history, the ac-
tual rules of the international order could
be based on a combination of values such
as democratic peace and human rights,
as well as on the balance of power,
though the respective weight of those two
principles continued to be contested.
Every crisis, political or economic, creates new
opportunities as well as new challenges, thus
prompting politicians and analysts to take new
daring steps – or at least consider them. The
range of that which is possible in world poli-
tics has broadened, and the level of uncer-
tainty has risen.
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This uncertain architecture was haunted by
two main challenges. One was about the
definition and recognition of the benevolent
dominant actor as well as of specific mecha-
nisms of defining and applying rules; an-
other concerned defining and dealing with
adversaries who more or less openly defied
those rules. Arguably, it was the first chal-
lenge that proved to contain the greatest
threats. While resources to deal with numer-
ous crises in the world have been over-
stretched, it was the deficit of consensus and
legitimacy when making and implementing
decisions on how to address them that con-
stituted an even greater problem.
The general trend during the post-Cold War
period has been one of a shrinking level of
consensus and legitimacy. The first Persian
Gulf War, the first major security challenge
of the post-Cold war era, was dealt with in
an almost exemplary way and led to an op-
timistic view of the “new world order” based
on a vision of the UN Security Council le-
gitimizing major decisions that regulate glo-
bal security. However, the inability of the UN
to tackle the crises in the Balkans led to
NATO taking the lead – and also estranging
Russia, which from that time on returned to
the Cold War view of NATO as an adversary
and a threat to Russia’s security. While Al-
Qaida’s attack against the US on 11 Septem-
ber 2001 did lead to the civilized world ral-
lying around the USA, the American inva-
sion in Iraq further eroded the consensus and
led to a serious trans-Atlantic rift. Although
Barack Obama’s first visit to Europe in the
spring of 2009 gave hopes for warmer trans-
Atlantic relations, there was no substantive
success either – for instance, there was no
significant increase of the European contribu-
tion to the NATO operation in Afghanistan.
How did the recent events influence
the global order?
What, if anything, has changed in a specifi-
cally political sense as a result of the events
mentioned in the beginning of this paper?
We have already noted increasing support
for the Keynesian rather than neo-liberal
attitudes in economic policies. But this does
not automatically imply major political
change on the global level. Can one discern
changes in assumptions about actors, rules,
and values that have defined global politics
after the Cold War?
This paper will examine this question on
the example of one of the important ele-
ments of the existing international order: The
relations between Russia and the West. One
can briefly discuss two indicators here: The
initial reaction of the international commu-
nity to Russian intervention in Georgia in
August 2008, and later efforts to “reset”
relations in the spring of 2009.
Western reaction to the Russian-Georgian war
may be criticized as weak and inconsistent,
though it was still timely and vigorous enough
to make a decisive impact on the course and
the outcome of the war. The apparent incon-
sistency was caused, on the one hand, by
divisions between different actors of the in-
ternational community, the weakness and
unpopularity of the US administration at the
moment, and, most importantly, by the need
to combine two policy objectives. On the one
hand, there was a necessity to preclude an
extremely dangerous precedent of Russia
openly threatening the sovereignty of its
neighbors and effectively turning the former
Soviet Union into its exclusive zone of influ-
ence. This called for a robust and aggressive
response. On the other hand, while Russia’s
action was unmistakably an act of hostility
towards NATO and the West, the vast major-
ity of western policy actors were extremely
wary of “isolating Russia” or “reverting to
the Cold War”, that is returning to openly
adversarial relations with Russia, since this
would shatter the existing international con-
sensus and call for a substantive redefinition
of the security and economic policies in
Europe and globally.
French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s energetic
mediation efforts, as well as President Bush’s
decision to send military warships to the
Black Sea presumably prevented Russia from
occupying the whole of Georgia and imple-
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menting its agenda of regime change. The
language of “no business as usual” with
Russia and the suspension of NATO-Russia
and EU-Russia cooperation formats was a way
for the West to send a vigorous message to
Russia saying that it would not tolerate such
behavior. Russia’s full compliance with the
terms of Sarkozy-Medvedev six-point plan that
implied return to the status quo ante was put
as a benchmark for starting the normalization
of relations between Russia and the West.
However, NATO and the EU later changed
these policies: Both NATO-Russia and EU-
Russia cooperation formats were restored
despite the fact that Russia has only par-
tially complied with the terms of Sarkozy-
Medvedev agreement. The global economic
crisis was one of the reasons for the change:
It shifted the focus of interest towards burn-
ing economic issues of the day which, among
other things, required greater cooperation
rather than confrontation between major eco-
nomic players, including Russia. Moreover,
global preoccupation with economic issues
strengthened the hand of the “pragmatists”
and “realists” thus weakening proponents of
approaches to international relations that call
for clear understanding of the long-term
policy objectives and strong commitment to
certain values and principles.
Admittedly, though, the global economic cri-
sis did not create a material necessity for
revising the terms of the Russian-Western
relations after the August war, so much as it
served as a good pretext for that. Maintain-
ing the initial stand of the “no business as
usual” with Russia until it at least fully com-
plied with the six-point plan, was increas-
ingly difficult. It became clear that Russia
was not going to comply with it. It was not
going to revoke its recognition of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, it was going to continue
to occupy (directly or through proxy forces)
Akhalgori District and other territories that
were firmly under Georgian control before
the war. This meant that the new cycle of
confrontation between the West and Russia,
including suspension of NATO-Russia as well
as EU-Russia relations, had to continue in-
definitely. However, maintaining Western con-
sensus on that stance proved impossible. There
were several factors that caused this:
(1)The pressure of economic interest groups,
especially in western Europe, that were
losing from the Russian-Western con-
frontation;
(2)Anti-American opinion in western Europe,
which saw the idea of NATO expansion,
as well as (more specifically)
Saakashvili’s government in Georgia, as
US projects whose support Washington
had imposed on Europe; actors influenced
by this opinion tend to put primary blame
on the fallout between Russia and the
West on the USA;
(3)The wish of Obama administration (as
well as the realist and isolationist school
on the American right) to distance itself
from President Bush’s policies that were
seen as naïve or hypocritical in that they
put support of democracy at the centre
of its foreign policy agenda; the pushing
of the “reset button” in the US-Russia
relations was supposed to demonstrate the
new sense of sober pragmatism.
Arguably, the response that Russia got after
the August war was not vigorous enough and
did not make Russia pay a price high enough
to deter its political leadership from consid-
ering similar military adventures in its neigh-
borhood. This causes legitimate concern in
Georgia, as well as among other neighbors
of Russia that depend on firm and consistent
Western support for their effective sovereignty
vis-à-vis their former metropolis. At the same
time, even the existing level of support is
crucial enough to make considerable change
and is widely appreciated in Georgia.
However, here we should ask a larger ques-
tion: Does the episode of the Russian-Geor-
gian war and its aftermath constitute any
qualitative change in relations between the
West and Russia that would enable us to talk
about a change in the post-Cold War political
order as we know it? To look at the issue
from the Georgian perspective, do changes in
Western policies justify fears that Georgia may
be “abandoned” to Russia’s mercy?
CIPDD Policy Review, April 2009
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The relationship between Russia and the
West had been complex and ambivalent since
the 1990s. It implied a combination of ef-
forts to establish cooperative relations, and
mistrust that bordered on hostility. This is
still the case. Differences between attitudes
of the US, western Europeans and formerly
Communist recent members of NATO and
the EU are no new matter either. It is often
said that the consequences of the August war
moved the prospect of Ukraine and Georgia
joining NATO even further down on the
agenda; this may be true, but the opposition
of major western European powers had made
this prospect quite vague even before the
August war. The “enlargement fatigue” (that
concerned further enlargement of both the
EU and NATO) had set in long before 2008.
Currently, “realists” who object to giving
priority to supporting small vulnerable na-
tions like Georgia at the expense of closer
relations with great powers like Russia over
issues of “real interest” for US security may
be on the offensive ideologically. But are
they winning the debate?
A substantive shift in the relations between
Russia and the West could occur either
through moving to a more open confronta-
tion, or through the West accommodating
what Russia considers its core interests. In-
dicators of the former would be, for instance,
the exclusion of Russia from the G8, per-
manently unraveling special cooperation for-
mats between NATO and Russia and EU and
Russia, and other similar or even bolder
steps. There are no signs of that happening.
On the other hand, what might more or less
satisfy Russia in its relations with the West
would be recognition of exclusive zone of
Russian influence in its neighborhood. The
indicators of this would be revoking NATO’s
commitment to eventually accepting Ukraine
and Georgia as members, recognition of
Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s indepen-
dence, turning a blind eye to a Russia-spon-
sored regime change in Georgia, and the like.
The way ties develop after relations between
the USA and Russia were ceremoniously “re-
set” (though the Clinton-Lavrov, and then
Obama-Medvedev meetings), do not point in
that direction. The EU’s decision to help
Ukraine fix its pipeline infrastructure with-
out consulting Russia first and NATO’s de-
cision to go ahead with its scheduled exer-
cises in Georgia have infuriated Russia. And
despite initial noises, Obama has not revoked
Bush’s project to position anti-missile de-
fense capacities in eastern Europe. Neither
did Russia make huge gains in terms of
expanding its influence in its neighborhood:
no country of the “near abroad” recognized
Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s indepen-
dence; despite initial hesitation, the
Moldovan government rejected a Russia-
sponsored peace plan in Transdniestria that
would legitimize Russian military presence
in that region. Squeezing the US military
base from Manas in Kyrgyzstan has been
the sole notable “achievement” so far.
Extremely close participation of the EU in
efforts to prevent destabilization in Georgia
in the context of the standoff between the
Georgian government and the opposition in
April 2009 has been another indicator that
EU has no intent to “abandon” Georgia to
Russia’s “zone of influence”. The EU in-
volvement clearly contradicts quite openly
expressed hopes of Russia’s leadership that
the protests would lead to the regime change
in Georgia.
Other Changes in the Region:
Russia, Ukraine, Turkey
While the relations between Russia and the
West are the key factor to watch, there are
a number of other areas where politicians,
analysts, and activists discuss possible
changes that may contribute to a signifi-
Does the episode of the Russian-Georgian war
and its aftermath constitute any qualitative
change in relations between the West and Russia
that would enable us to talk about a change in
the post-Cold War political order as we know
it? To look at the issue from the Georgian
perspective, do changes in western policies jus-
tify fears that Georgia may be “abandoned” to
Russia’s mercy?
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cant revision in the regional security archi-
tecture.
(1)Economic crisis in Russia and the stabil-
ity of the Russian political regime.
Every government has to grapple with chal-
lenges created by the global economic cri-
sis, but Russia is among those countries
that have suffered especially heavy losses.
The flight of foreign capital started imme-
diately after the August war, when there
was no talk of a global financial crisis yet.
Later, the abrupt drop in oil prices was
especially painful, because Russian eco-
nomic growth and public finances depend
heavily on oil revenues. The Russian gov-
ernment admitted that having oil prices
under $70 per barrel would send Russia’s
budget into a deficit territory – and for
several months, oil prices have stayed much
lower than that.
In some circles this created expectations that
the continuing crisis could lead to a politi-
cal turmoil and eventually endanger the
current Russian leadership. There is also
speculation about growing tensions within the
ruling Medvedev-Putin diarchy. Since the
crisis is still under way and there is no
certainty how long it is going to continue, it
is too early to dismiss these expectations
altogether. But so far there are no signs of
any significant challenges to Russia’s politi-
cal regime. Huge currency reserves allow
Russia to weather the economic storm for
some time to come.
Objectively, the economic crisis has con-
tributed to shifting the balance of global
power away from Russia rather than other-
wise. Despite this, the Russian leadership
appears to see the crisis as an opportunity
for expanding its foreign policy interests
through employing its considerable reserves
in the short run. The aforementioned deal
with Kyrgyzstan that pushed that country
to dismantle the US military base in return
for a Russian financial aid package and the
recent strategically important acquisition of
a 21.2 percent share in MOL, a leading
Hungarian Oil and Gas company, by the
Kremlin-controlled Surgut Neftegaz, are
examples of this.
These developments demonstrate that ana-
lysts should be extremely cautious in pre-
dicting both the future trajectory of internal
political developments in Russia as well as
how assertive Russian foreign policies are
going to be. Russia has considerable struc-
tural vulnerabilities such as overdependence
of its economy on oil and gas revenues, the
inherent instability of the North Caucasus
region and strained relations with interna-
tional players. The moment before the Au-
gust war may prove to have been the apex
of its international influence, at least for a
considerable time to come. The develop-
ments of recent months show, however, that
despite the severity of the blows dealt by
the economic crisis, the current Russian
regime still has considerable resources for
maintaining internal stability and has not
given up on attempts to expand its interna-
tional power base.
This means Russia remains a grave security
threat to Georgia for the time being without
any prospect for substantive change in the
foreseeable future. While some analysts do
not rule out Russia’s repeat military inter-
vention in Georgia, such a move would
constitute an especially brazen affront to the
international community and further under-
mine Russia’s interests. This makes it un-
likely, though even such an irrational action
cannot be ruled out completely. Russian lead-
ers constant rhetoric that they will not talk
to president Saakashvili but would accept a
new leadership in Georgia is an open en-
couragement of internal destabilization in
Georgia with regime change as the desired
outcome.
(2)Fears of political and economic implo-
sion in Ukraine.
While Russia is the gravest threat to Geor-
gia, Ukraine has been a key ally in recent
years. Georgia and Ukraine are often linked
together in the context of closer cooperation
CIPDD Policy Review, April 2009
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with NATO and the European Union.
Ukraine’s progress on the road to the EU
and NATO would pave way for Georgia as
well. Conversely, when analysts talk of
Russia’s efforts to engineer change in the
policies of its neighbors, Ukraine and Geor-
gia are usually mentioned in the same vein.
Ukraine also happens to be another country
especially hardly hit by the economic crisis.
Unlike Russia, its internal political system,
though much more democratic, is fraught
with persistent political infighting that fre-
quently brings the government to near pa-
ralysis and severely damages its capacity to
deal with the emerging challenges. Recent
developments created a fear of an imminent
“chaos and dictatorship” and/or “forced take-
over of power”.
This endangers not only internal political
stability, but also the firmness of the
country’s orientation towards Western insti-
tutions. Among the three major power cen-
ters within today’s Ukraine, those led by
President Viktor Yushchenko, Prime Minis-
ter Yulia Timoshenko, and the opposition
leader Viktor Yanukovich, only the first has
a firm pro-Western position, with Yanukovich
representing the pro-Russian stance and
Timoshenko tending to opportunistic posi-
tions. In the event that Ukraine implodes,
Russia has much greater resources to influ-
ence internal Ukrainian developments than
it has in Georgia, since there is strong pub-
lic support for pro-Russian policies in east-
ern Ukraine.
Ukraine’s implosion and/or shift to a pro-
Russian camp would severely undermine
Georgia’s regional position. In Europe too
there is a growing understanding that such a
scenario would be extremely undesirable.
While the worst-case scenario for Ukraine
cannot be ruled out, it can also be avoided.
Ukraine’s pluralistic political system, while
not effective enough to successfully tackle
issues such as the fight against corruption
or economic reform, has proven resilient
enough to weather recurring political storms,
and it may find resources to overcome the
latest one without major losses.
(3)Are Turkey’s policies changing? The big-
gest unknown
The most novel, but also somewhat uncer-
tain, set of developments that could shift
regional security set-up, has been occur-
ring in Turkey in recent months. Within
days after the Russian invasion of Geor-
gia, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoðan visited Moscow publicizing a
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Pact
initiative. On 6 September, Turkish Presi-
dent Abdullah Gül made a surprise visit
to attend a football match in Yerevan, thus
launching a series of Turkish-Armenian
consultations that were widely expected to
result in establishing diplomatic relations
as well as reopening the border between
the two countries.
Despite some excitement that both these
developments – especially the latter one –
initially brought, it is still early to speak of
any tangible results of both these initiatives.
The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Pact
appears to be stillborn: The most conspicu-
ous fact about it is that in the months since
August, there has been no attempt to attach
any substance to this idea. Analysts and
politicians are left to speculate on what the
initiative did imply. Most likely, it was an
expression of a general desire by the Turk-
ish leadership to play more active role in
the Caucasus. There could have been a tacit
proposal to Russia: let’s regulate Caucasian
affairs together, thus crowding out Europe-
ans and Americans. It could be intended to
mend a minor crisis in Russian-Turkish re-
lations caused by the crackdown by Russian
customs on Turkish trucks in the context of
Russian-Georgian war. As Russia had espe-
cially strained relations with the West in
those days, the Turkish leadership could hope
that such a deal would look attractive to the
Russians.
Russia remains a grave security threat to Geor-
gia for the time being without any prospect for
substantive change in the foreseeable future.
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President Gül’s visit to Yerevan and sub-
sequent diplomatic activities look more
promising. On 22 April, the Foreign Min-
isters of Turkey, Armenia and Switzerland
issued a joint statement that expressed
readiness of the both parties to work to-
ward improving mutual relations within the
framework of a roadmap under Swiss aus-
pices. This may be considered a serious
breakthrough. However, in their public
statements, the Turkish leaders also re-
stated their previous position that the pros-
pect of Turkish-Armenian normalization
was linked to the solution of the Karabakh
conflict. There is strong opposition to the
process within both Turkey and Armenia.
This shows that further negotiations may
prove difficult and most analysts are re-
luctant to predict their results.
This demonstrates that Turkish efforts to
redefine security architecture in the
Caucasus have not necessarily been based
on a carefully thought-out plan but are
rather part of a general process under way
in Turkish society and the political elite,
which is aimed at reformulating and rene-
gotiating Turkey’s relations with the West.
By making forays into the Caucasus, Tur-
key may be groping for a new policy op-
tions in its neighborhood, and also trying
to increase its negotiating position with
its western partners. A truly enormous
change would occur if expectations of the
“orientalization” of Turkish foreign policy
materialize, thus reversing the century-
long Turkish policy of allying with west-
ern powers. Most analysts inside and
outside Turkey, however, think that the
ongoing processes will bring a readjust-
ment, rather than a significant break, in
Turkish-American and Turkish-European
relations.
For the South Caucasus and Georgia in par-
ticular, the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation,
if it takes place, will constitute a genuine
and important change. Some analysts con-
sider Georgia a potential loser from this de-
velopment. It is true that Georgia may thus
lose its privileged position in some transit-
related economic projects. On the balance,
however, improvement of relations between
Turkey and Armenia may become an impor-
tant step towards reducing tensions in the
South Caucasus. It will also lessen Armenia’s
dependence on Russia and help Armenia con-
nect with Western interests in the region.
These developments would be beneficial for
Georgia as well.
Georgia’s Foreign and Security
Policies: Stay the Course but Adjust
to the New Realities
To sum up the above, one could say that
as a result of recent changes in global
politics, Georgia’s security environment has
become more fluid, uncertain and unpre-
dictable than it was a year ago. Yet careful
analysis shows that actual changes in glo-
bal and regional politics that have occurred
so far are much more modest than exag-
gerated expectation of the “paradigm shift”
or “dismantling of the post-Cold War world
order” might suggest.
This also implies that there is no need to
fundamentally change Georgia’s regional and
security policies, which are based on close
cooperation with Western countries and in-
stitutions, primarily NATO and the European
Union. Though there is a necessity to read-
just policies based on past experiences and
recent trends. Here are several major direc-
tions for such a readjustment.
(1)Since 2004, the Georgian government
acted on the assumption that it was pos-
sible to solve the most burning issues of
Georgia’s security – resolve the separat-
ist conflicts, get membership of NATO –
within several years. Today, while both
issues maintain their great significance,
Improvement of relations between Turkey and
Armenia may become an important step to-
wards reducing tensions in the South Caucasus.
It will also lessen Armenia’s dependence on
Russia and help Armenia connect with Western
interests in the region. These developments
would be beneficial for Georgia as well.
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fast progress and short-term solutions are
obviously unrealistic. Therefore, foreign
policies should be based more on long-
term objectives and planning, and focused
on taking more incremental steps towards
those objectives.
(2)Closer cooperation with NATO and the
EU aimed at eventual integration should
continue to be the guiding principles of
Georgia’s foreign policy, as they offer
the best options for Georgia’s political
and economic development. At the same
time, a better balance should be found
in cooperation with NATO and with the
EU, as well as with the USA and with
the European powers. In 2004-2007, the
prospect of swift integration into NATO
without any similar prospects with re-
gard to the EU, naturally pushed EU-
Georgia relations to the background. The
prospect of NATO accession mostly de-
pended on the support of the USA,
whose influence on regional affairs
strongly overshadowed that of European
countries. But, against the backdrop of
trans-Atlantic rivalries and jealousies, the
close link between the USA and Geor-
gia apparently contributed to hardening
western European opposition to Georgia’s
NATO membership.
In today’s circumstances, Georgia’s rela-
tions with NATO and with the EU follow
the track of ever deeper cooperation rather
than imminent integration. Therefore, they
should be better balanced against each
other. Moreover, the circumstances both of
the August war and the April 2009 politi-
cal crisis have demonstrated that the EU
is an increasingly important player in the
region. There is no ground to believe that,
after the change of administration in Wash-
ington, US support to Georgia has dimin-
ished in any substantive sense, but it also
may be difficult to recreate the same level
of chemistry in bilateral relations that used
to be based on the linkage of Bush’s “lib-
erty agenda” and the “Rose Revolution”
that brought the current Georgian govern-
ment to power. The Georgian government
needs to strengthen its relations with the
EU and major European powers, without
in any way diminishing the importance of
relations with the US.
(3)In today’s world, foreign and security
policies cannot be divorced from inter-
nal ones. Deepening democratic reforms
and facilitating national consensus around
the rules of the political game is the
foremost – if extremely challenging –
task of the Georgian government. The
radical demands of the opposition should
be handled with a due combination of
strict defense of the constitutional order
and adequate flexibility that would al-
low the part of society alienated by the
government policies to be amply repre-
sented and heard in the political pro-
cess. The temptation of solving complex
problems “once and for all” should be
avoided.
(4)Normalizing relations with Russia is of
utmost importance for the Georgian state.
The government should seize any oppor-
tunity in this direction if such arises. A
sober assessment, however, suggests that
relations with Russia based on partner-
ship, cooperation and mutual respect is
not a viable option for the foreseeable
future, unless there are deep changes in
Russia’s leadership and policies. Like-
wise, changes in the Georgian leadership
may bring change in bilateral relations
only if there is a fundamental change in
the country’s political orientation. There-
fore, in the short and maybe medium
term the objective is to minimize immi-
nent threats coming from the northern
neighbor.
There is no need to fundamentally change
Georgia’s regional and security policies, which
are based on close cooperation with Western
countries and institutions, primarily NATO and
the European Union.
A better balance should be found in cooperation
with NATO and with the EU, as well as with
the USA and with the European powers.
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(5)Ukraine, Azerbaijan and former Commu-
nist countries neighboring Russia continue
to be natural allies of Georgia because
they share and understand Georgia’s se-
curity concerns better than any other
country. Despite Turkey’s somewhat in-
consistent policies of late, there is a large
area of overlapping interests with this
country. With Armenia’s policies of bal-
ance and complementarity in relations
with different powers, there are good
prospects of continuing good working
relationships with this important neigh-
bor. Therefore, recent changes have not
undermined Georgia’s regional position
and it should pursue vigorous regional
policies aimed at maintaining fruitful
cooperation with all regional countries ex-
cept for Russia.
(6)The results of the August war, especially
the Russian recognition of the separatist
de facto states and the following mili-
tary build-up on their territories, signifi-
cantly undermined chances of solution
of those conflicts based on respect for
Georgia’s territorial integrity. However,
no Georgian government is expected to,
will or should give up on the general
aim of eventually finding such a solu-
tion. As this is the case, there is a need
to seek avenues for dialogue with dif-
ferent actors in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, though it should be recognized
that there will be no short-term political
gains from such contacts. Such efforts
may be low-profile, but they should be
consistent and systematic.
Deepening democratic reforms and facilitating
national consensus around the rules of the
political game is the foremost – if extremely
challenging – task of the Georgian government.
Please visit CIPDD’s blog at www.cipdd.org to comment on the paper.
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